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Abstract
Rent seeking is often studied with reference to a contemporaneous rent evaluated
at a point in time. We study the social cost of rent seeking when rents endure
over time, but may have to be re-contested because of imperfect rent protection,
or may disappear because of deregulation. The present value of a contested rent
measures the social cost of rent seeking, irrespective of imperfect rent protection
and the prospect of deregulation. Rent seeking is discouraged by the inability of
governments to commit to protect rents and by their inability to commit to rent-
generating regulations and policies. Moreover, lasting deregulation can preempt a
substantial fraction of the potential rent seeking cost.
Keywords: Rent seeking, contests, rent dissipation, deregulation, liberalization,
commitment
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1 Introduction
The focal question in the study of rent seeking is what is the magnitude of the social loss
when resources are unproductively used in contesting rents. Answers are not straightfor-
ward because of the absence of empirical observations on resources used in rent seeking.
The approach taken has been to attempt to infer the value of social losses from observed
values of rents available to be contested. Initial studies pointing out the importance of
rent seeking simply presumed complete rent dissipation and so took the value of observed
rents to measure social losses of rent seeking (Tullock, 1967; Posner, 1975; Krueger, 1974;
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Cowling and Mueller, 1978). With competitive free entry into contests and risk neutrality,
rent dissipation is indeed complete (Hillman and Katz, 1984). Rent dissipation is also
complete in strategic contests when the rent-seeking contest takes the form of an all-pay
auction (Hillman and Samet, 1987; Baye et al. 1996). If rent dissipation is complete,
observed values of monopoly prots or protectionist rents can be added to the Harberger
deadweight losses of resource misallocation to establish the complete social costs of rent
creation. Likewise, complete social costs can be computed from observed rents for regula-
tion of industry that inhibits competitive market entry, assignment of budgetary revenue,
and personal benets from political appointment.
The numerous studies of contestability of rents (see the overview by Congleton, Hill-
man, and Konrad, 2008) have typically investigated rent dissipation as if rents were created,
contested, and dissipated at the same point in time. Rents however in general endure over
time. At the same time, rights to durable rents are in general not everlasting. Rather,
rents may be re-contested in the future. The rents themselves also need not persist
indenitely. Deregulation, liberalization, or reform of the government bureaucracy can
eliminate rents, although after elimination a rent may be recreated at some future date.
Rent seekers can be expected to be aware that rights to rents are imperfectly protected
and that future policies may temporarily or permanently eliminate rents.
In this paper, we study rents that endure over time. We consider how imperfect rent
protection and the possibility that rents may be eliminated and recreated in the future
a¤ect the social cost of rent seeking. We also consider how much of the social cost of rent
seeking can be preempted by future institutional or policy change that allows permanent
elimination of rents.
When future rights to rents are imperfectly protected and rents are not assured to
persist, the value of a rent is discounted by the likelihood that the rent may need to
be re-contested. Rent dissipation at the time at which the rent is initially created is
consequently less than the present value of the rent. Evaluation of rent dissipation therefore
requires recognition that rights to rents may only be imperfectly protected and that rents,
rather than persisting indenitely, may be temporarily or permanently eliminated by future
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deregulation or liberalization. We introduce these time-related considerations into a model
of rent seeking. We show that the present value of a rent at the time when a rent is created
nonetheless measures total social cost due to creation of a rent. Rent dissipation becomes
complete over the course of time as rents are re-contested.
If rights to rents were perfectly protected and rents were to persist indenitely, the ini-
tial (and only) contest would evidently be for the present value of the indenitely retained
rent. Rents would then be contested and dissipated only at the time of initial creation.
In that case, future rents are but transfers. As noted by Tullock, 1971), transfers that
are not contestable have no social cost. With full protection of future rights to rents, re-
sources used in rent seeking are then entirely sunk costs and cannot be a¤ected by future
deregulation or liberalization. With contemporaneous deadweight costs typically small
and all social costs of rent seeking already incurred in the past, the basis is provided for a
presumption of "disinterest in deregulation" (McCormick et al., 1984).1
Imperfect rent protection and the risk of elimination of rents, however, create prospects
of social gain from deregulation and other liberalizing policy change. The degree of rent
protection and promises made by governments not to deregulate in the future are attributes
of political institutions. They reect abilities of governments to commit. When rents
endure over time, there are social benets from a governments inability to commit not
to allow a rent to be re-contested or not to eliminate rents in the future. When rights
to rents are imperfectly protected and there is no assurance that rents will not disappear,
we show that substantial parts of the potential rent seeking cost are preempted by future
institutional reforms that do indeed permanently eliminate rents.
Persisting rents are therefore not irrelevant for social loss after the rents have been
created. Rather, consequences for social loss persist over time, as do consequences for
social gain from elimination of rents.
Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 shows that, with imperfect rent protection
and a risk of rent elimination, the present value of a rent at the time of creation nonetheless
1While deregulation or other policy reform in these circumstances could not recoup past sunk rent
seeking losses, there would, of course, be distributional consequences of deregulation or liberalization
(Cherkas et al., 1986; Crew and Rowley, 1988).
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is the measure of social loss due to rent seeking. In other words, rent dissipation does
not depend on either of these imperfections. Section 4 analyzes the benets of lasting
deregulation. Section 5 poses generalizations of the analysis and shows that neither
institutional volatility nor asymmetric information about the intensions of policy makers
are sources of under-dissipation. Section 6 introduces a specic class of contest success
functions. It establishes a link between imperfect rent protection and the degree of under-
dissipation for certain contest success functions. Concluding remarks are in section 7.
2 The model
We consider an economy with n risk neutral agents who compete to obtain a rent. The
value of the rent is  per period and the same for all agents. The probability that agent
i wins the rent is
qi = q (y1; ::yi; :::yn) ; (1)
which is increasing in the resources used by agent i, yi, and decreasing in the resources
used by other agents. The rent seeking contest takes place though discrete time t =
0; 1; 2; 3; ::::1. The future is discounted with the discount factor .
The rent itself is enduring, but the property rights to the rent are insecure. This can
be so for many reasons. For example, current governments cannot fully commit not to
withdraw privileges in the future, nor can they tie the hands of future governments. To
capture this, we assume that there is a probability p that the winner of the rent (called
the incumbent) might lose the rent in subsequent periods. We interpret p as a measure
of rent protection: if p = 1, the rent is fully protected and the winner of the rent in
the rst period has rights to it forever; if p = 0, the rent is not protected at all and is
only won for one period at the time. An incumbent may lose a rent won in the past
for two main reasons. Firstly, the government, which initially created the rent, may
want to orchestrate a new contest to reassign the rent (Gradstein and Konrad, 1999).
Secondly, the government may eliminate the rent all together, e.g., through deregulation
of monopolies, through liberalization of trade or reform of the government bureaucracy.
This would happen, for example, if a new government comes to power and deregulates an
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industry, although the decision may be reversed by some future government. Specically,
in periods after the incumbent has lost the rights to the rent, a new contest is orchestrated
with probability 1  z, while with probability z, the rent is eliminated for that period and
thus not contestable. A higher z makes it less likely that the rent can be re-contested in
periods after it is lost and liberalization, deregulation or, more generally, rent-destroying
reforms are more enduring and less likely to be reversed. If z = 1, the loss of the rent
is followed by permanent deregulation and the rent never again becomes contestable; if
z = 0, the loss of the rent is followed immediately by a new contest and e¤ectively no
deregulation or liberalization is taking place; the rent is just reassigned. Alternatively, we
can interpret z as an inverse measure of the governments commitment to rent-generating
regulations and policies. The two parameters p and z are attributes of institutions that
are common knowledge and reect abilities of governments (understood as the creators of
contestable rents) to commit.
The structure of the model is sketched in Figure 1 for the rst three periods. When
the rent is initially created in period 0, a contest takes place and the state of the economy
is C (contest). After that, it is revealed whether the rent is protected or not. If it is, the
winner the incumbent keeps the rent and the economy is in state M (monopoly) in
period 1 and no contest takes place. If not, the rent is either reassigned though a new
contest and the economy is in state C or the rent is deregulated and is not contestable
and the economy is in state L (liberalization). The possible transitions from period 1 to
2 are indicated with dotted lines. We note that if the state is L at time 1, then the rent
either continues to be deregulated (and the economy is in state L in period 2) or the rent
is recreated and a new contest takes place in period 2.
The main question we are interested is: does imperfect rent protection (p < 1) and/or
the governments inability to commit to rent-generating regulations and policies (z > 0)
lead to under-dissipation of the rent? That is, does uncertainty about future rights to the
rent reduce the social cost associated with its initial creation? While this is the primary
question, it is also of interest to study the total rent seeking cost. Ultimately, rent seeking
is costly because resources are being used unproductively. This reduces the productive
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Figure 1: The structure of the model.
base of an economy and the scarce resources invested in winning rents reduce national
income. The real cost of this reallocation of resources from productive to unproductive
activities depends on the total rent seeking cost. In models in which the value of the
contested rent is xed, the dissipation rate and the total resources going into rent seeking
are normally two sides of the same coin.2 However, in our baseline model, variations
in p and z a¤ect the total rent seeking cost independently of the dissipation rate. It is,
therefore, of interest to inquire how these factors increase or decrease the total social cost
of rent seeking, and to ask how much of the total social cost of rent seeking, if any, can be
preempted through permanent deregulation at some point in time after the rent has rst
been created.
3 Rent dissipation and the total cost of rent seeking
As long as rent seeking persists, there is a social loss due to contestability of the rent.
Resource use in quest of the rent and rent dissipation ceases, as pointed out by Congleton
(1980), only when a successful winner of the contest is announced. However, rights to a
rent that has been won in the past may not be secure in the future (p < 1). Moreover, the
rent may altogether disappear, perhaps to return at some further point in time (z > 0).
2Aidt (2002) discusses what happens when the size of the rent depends on the investments made by
the contenders.
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As noted above, we think of z as a measure of the governments inability to commit not
to deregulate, while we interpret p as a measure of the security of the property rights to
rents won in the past.
The model has three states of the world: st 2 fM;C;Lg : M is the state where the rent
is maintained by the incumbent and is uncontested; C is the state where the incumbent
loses the right to the rent but the rent is re-contested immediately; and L is the state
where the incumbent loses the right to the rent and the rent disappears and so is not
contestable in that period. We note that the contenders for the rent face three sources of
uncertainty. There is uncertainty because of imperfect rent protection, as the winner of
the rent in a given period will only keep the rent in the next and subsequent periods with
probability p. Furthermore, whenever rights to the rent are lost, there is a risk (z) that a
new contest will not take place and the rent is non-contestable, but if a new contest does
take place, contenders are faced with uncertainty regarding the outcome.
To characterize the individually optimal rent seeking strategy of contender i, we con-
struct the relevant value functions and look for Nash equilibria. First, suppose that st = L.
Since no contest takes place in this state and any preexisting rights to the rent have been
lost, the value function of contender i is
V it (L) = [zV
i
t+1 (L) + (1  z)V it+1(C)]; (2)
where V it+1(C) is the continuation value starting from a state where a contest takes place.
Next, suppose that st = M . We distinguish between the continuation value of the
winner of the previous contest (w) and that of a contender who lost the previous contest
(l). The value function for the winner is
V wit (M) =  + 

pV wit+1(M) + (1  p)[zV it+1 (L) + (1  z)V it+1(C)]

: (3)
The winner is successful in obtaining the rent in the current period and keeps it without
a contest in the next period with probability p. With probability 1  p, the winner loses
rights to the rent. In this case, the rent disappears with probability z and no contest
takes place, but with probability 1  z, he competes again in an attempt to re-secure the
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rent. The value function for a representative loser is
V lit (M) = 

pV lit+1(M) + (1  p)[zV it+1 (L) + (1  z)V it+1(C)]

: (4)
Each loser of a contest will with probability p continue being a loser next period simply
because the rent stays with the incumbent. With probability (1  p) (1  z), the rent
becomes contestable again in the subsequent period and each (past) loser can compete to
obtain it; with probability z (1  p), the rent does not become contestable in the subsequent
period.
When the state of the world is st = C and a contest takes place, all contenders face an
identical problem.3 We can write the value function as:
V it (C) = qti   yti + qtifpV wit+1(M) + (1  p) [zV it+1 (L) + (1  z)V it+1(C)]g (5)
+(1  qti) fpV lit+1(M) + (1  p)[zV it+1 (L) + (1  z)V it+1(C)]g:
In the current period, the expected gain is qti   yti where yti represents the rent seeking
expenditure by contender i and qti is the within-period expected value of winning the
rent. The future payo¤ depends on whether or not a contender has won the contest. If a
contender wins, which occurs with probability qti, the rent is either kept or lost in the next
period. A contender who lost the contest in period t, which happens with probability
1   qti, will continue to be a loser in the next period if the rent is protected, or is given
a new chance to compete if the current incumbent loses rights to the rent, but only with
probability (1  z).
We can rewrite equation (5) to get
V it (C) = qti   yti + qtip

V wit+1(M)  V lit+1(M)

+K; (6)
where K =  (1  p) zV it+1 (L) + (1  z)V it+1(C)+ pV lit+1(M) and is independent of the
investments made by the contenders in period t. The di¤erence between the continuation
value of a winner and a loser in state M at time t+ j is
V wit+j(M)  V lit+j(M) =  + 
 
V wit+j+1(M)  V lit+j+1(M)

. (7)
3We treat contenders symmetrically in each contest. An alternative is to assume that the winner of the
contest may have to ght again in the future to protect his rent, while past losers do not get to contest
the rent in the future (Stephan and Ursprung, 1998).
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Forward substitution yields that
V wit+j(M)  V lit+j(M) =
1X
k=0
(p)k  =

1  p: (8)
Substituting this into equation (6), we get that the continuation value of a contender in
state C can be written as
V it (C) = qit

1  p   yit +K: (9)
A Nash equilibrium of the contest played in state C at time t is dened as a vector of
resources fyitgni=1 to be invested such that for each contender i, yit = maxyit V it
 
C; y it

,
where y it denotes the vector of investments of the n   1 other contenders. We assume
that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in each contest and that the corresponding
equilibrium strategies are played each time the state is C. Given that, equation (9)
implies that qti = qi and yti = yi all t such that st = C and that the equilibrium path
of the economy must be stationary for any given contest success function. Using this
observation, equations (2), (3) and (4) can be rewritten as
V i (L) =
(1  z) V i(C)
1  z (10)
V wi (M) =
 +  (1  p) (1  z) V i(C)
1 z
1  p (11)
V li (M) =
 (1  p) (1  z) V i(C)
1 z
1  p : (12)
We can use these expressions to solve equation (9) to get
V i (C) =
(1  z) (1  p)
(1  zp) (1  )

qi

1  p   yi

: (13)
It is well-known that the degree of rent dissipation depends on the particular attributes
of the contest, including the properties of the contest success function, risk aversion, and
the number of contenders. To isolate the e¤ects of imperfect rent protection on the
extent of rent dissipation from all these other inuences, we begin by assuming conditions
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such that one dollar of assured rent at a point in time attracts one dollar of resources in
each contest, i.e., the expected present value of the rent, 
1 p , is fully dissipated in each
contest.4 We consider a specic class of contest success function in section 6 and discuss
how p and z might reinforce or weaken other reasons for under-dissipation. The value of
the rent in each contest is larger than  unless the rights to the rent are lost with certainty
in the period after the rent is won (p = 0). If rent protection is perfect (p = 1), the
contenders e¤ectively compete for the entire present value of the rent in the rst period,
as proposed by McCormick et al. (1984).
We want to know if imperfect rent protection and the risk that rents become non-
contestable lead to under-dissipation of the rent. By assumption, whenever a contest
takes place, resources equal to 
1 p are used in contesting the rent. Does that, in present
value terms, lead to under-dissipation? The answer is, perhaps surprisingly, no.
Proposition 1 Assume that rent dissipation is complete in each contest.
1. The present value of the resources attracted to rent seeking equals the present value
of the contestable rent for all p and z.
2. The present value of resources attracted to rent seeking is
R (z; p) =
(1  z)
(1  ) (1  pz) (14)
and is increasing in p and decreasing in z.
Proof. Let R (st) denote the present value of resources used up by rent seeking in state
st 2 fC;M;Lg. The value of resources entering rent seeking is
R (C) =

1  p + pR (M) +  (1  p) (1  z)R (C) +  (1  p) zR (L) ; (15)
where
R (M) = pR (M) +  (1  p) (1  z)R (C) +  (1  p) zR (L) (16)
4See Hillman and Katz (1984), Hillman and Samet (1987) and Baye et al. (1996). There are various
reasons for under-dissipation at a point in time: see the survey by Nitzan (1994) and the overviews
by Mueller (2003), Hillman (2008), and Congleton, Hillman, and Konrad (2008). On the other hand,
countervailing behavior or resistance through sabotage in contests can increase rent dissipation (Konrad,
2000).
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and
R (L) = zR (L) +  (1  z)R (C) : (17)
Solving this system of value functions yields:
R (C; z; p) =
(1  z) (1  p)
(1  ) (1  pz)

1  p =
(1  z)
(1  ) (1  pz) : (18)
Since the rent  may not become contestable immediately after the incumbents rights to
it have been lost, the present value of the rent is not 
1  but is calculated as follows. Let
U(R) denote the present value of the rent in state st = M and st = C and let U (L) be
the present value in state st = L. The value of the contestable rent is, therefore,
U (R) =  + pU (R) +  (1  p) (1  z)U (R) +  (1  p) zU (L) ; (19)
where
U (L) =  (1  z)U (R) + zU (L) : (20)
Solving these equations yields
U (R; z; p) =
(1  z)
(1  ) (1  pz) : (21)
So, we conclude that
R (C; z; p)
U (R; z; p)
= 1 (22)
for all p and z
We interpret proposition 1 as a neutrality result: under the assumption that rent
dissipation is complete in each contest, neither imperfect protection of enduring rents,
nor the risk that rents become non-contestable a¤ect the rent dissipation rate. That
is, irrespective of whether the rent is extremely well-protected or not protected at all, or
something in between, the sequence of contests over time initiated by the creation of the
rent dissipates the present value of the rent completely.
To see the intuition behind this result, suppose that rents become contestable as soon
as they are lost (z = 0). In each period in which a contest takes place, the contenders
spend in total 
1 p the present value of the rent discounted by the probability of keeping
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the rent in the future. The ex ante probability that a contest takes place in a given
period is 1   p. Therefore, the present value of the resources spent on rent seeking is

1 p +  (1  p) 1 p + 2 (1  p) 1 p + :::. This is precisely equal to the present value of
the rent 
1  for any p. Hence, in response to imperfect rent protection, contenders spend
less than 
1  in each contest, as the prospect of keeping the rent is uncertain. However,
the part of the present value of the rent that is not dissipated in the rst contest will be
dissipated eventually in future contests and repeated competition for the rent dissipates
it completely. In e¤ect, this reects a trade o¤ between two conicting forces, which is
also considered by Gürtler (2007). On the one hand, the better protected the rent is, the
more resource will be invested in rent seeking in each contest. On the other hand, contests
become less frequent. In our model, the two e¤ects net exactly out. The proposition
shows that this fundamental result continues to hold when there is a risk that rents may
not be contestable after they are lost (z > 0). The reason is that during periods in which
the rent is not contestable due to, for example, rent-destroying reforms, resources are not
wasted on rent seeking.
While proposition 1 shows that a governments inability to commit to protect rents
and/or to refrain from rent-destroying reforms does not matter for the rent dissipation rate,
it is clear that the timing of dissipation is a¤ected by both p and z. The timing pattern has
two interesting implications. These are most clearly seen if we, again, assume that z = 0.
First, the degree of rent protection has intergenerational consequences. In particular, if
p = 1 so that commitment to rent protection is perfect, the entire present value of the
rent is dissipated in the rst period and thus borne by the current generation. If p = 0
and government lacks any commitment power,  will be contested and dissipated each
period. In this case, the social burden of rent seeking is shared equally among generations.
Generally, the more secure are rights to a rent, the more infrequent are the contests and the
more is dissipated in each contest. Second, p < 1 is a reection of a governments inabilities
to grant lasting property rights to the rents it creates. Commitment to protection of rents
may be more di¢ cult in a democracy with frequent government changes and where current
12
governments cannot perfectly tie the hands of future governments5 than in authoritarian
regimes where rulers may be able to grant privilege more permanently. As a consequence,
in authoritarian regimes we would expect greater contestability at the time rents are
created, and a greater burden in terms of rent dissipation at that time. In democracies
rent seeking will tend to be spread out more over time. Rent seeking expenditures are
resources used unproductively. Insofar as diversion of resources away from productive use
in the early stages of development has lasting e¤ects, this observation provides yet another
reason why many authoritarian societies have failed to develop economically.6 This e¤ect
would be strengthen if the size of the rent in future periods were diminished endogenously
by high initial levels of rent seeking under authoritarian rule.7
The second part of proposition 1 shows that the total rent seeking cost depends on p
and z. This is because the present value of the contestable rent depends on the degree of
rent protection and the risk of rent-destroying reforms.8 These parameters are intrinsically
linked to the nature of political institutions and politiciansability to make commitments.
Two important points can be made. First, political competition makes rents insecure.
This is because future governments may re-open or re-orchestrate rent seeking contests and
take away privileges bestowed in the past and policies favoring special interests. Political
competition can also be the basis for expectations of rent-destroying reforms, e.g., if a more
pro-liberalization government is expected to take o¢ ce in the future. Political competition
thereby reduces the total cost of rent seeking both by making rents less secure (lower p)
and by creating expectations of (lasting) rent-destroying reforms (higher z). Second,
much economic literature is concerned with ine¢ ciencies that arise because government
cannot commit. Interestingly, when rents endure over time, there are social benets from
a governments inability to commit. The benets arise because of the inability to commit
5See, e.g., Persson and Svensson (1989).
6This for example happens if barriers are created to technological adoption (Parete and Prescott, 1994).
7We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this possibility and for pointing out that there is less
room in a democracy for rent seeking because of better protected property rights.
8We note that the comparative static results discussed below do not dependent on the assumption
of full rent dissipation in each contest. They would hold for any contest success function that leads to
under-dissipation in each contest as long as the total resources going into rent seeking are an increasing
function of the value of the contestable rent.
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to protect rents. This makes rent seekers less willing to invest resources to obtain the rent
and reduces the overall social cost of rent seeking by reducing the value of the rents to be
contested. Likewise, the inability to commit not to attempt to instigate rent-destroying
reforms (high z), such as a liberalization of trade or deregulation of monopolies, decreases
the social cost of rent seeking.
4 The benets of lasting deregulation
How much of the total rent seeking cost can be preempted by lasting rent-destroying
reforms (deregulation)? To answer this question, we dene the gain from lasting dereg-
ulation (GLD (p)) as the di¤erence between the discounted present value of rent seeking
expenditures when there is no commitment to deregulation (z = 0) and a situation in
which deregulation, when it happens, is permanent (z = 1), relative to the rent seeking
cost without deregulation:
GLD (p) =
R (0; p) R (1; p)
R (0; p)
; (23)
where R (z; p) is given in equation (14). We nd:
Proposition 2 The gain from lasting deregulation is
GLD

(p) =
(1  p) 
(1  p) ; (24)
which is decreasing in p.
Proof. The proposition follows immediately from equation (??)
A number of consequences follow from proposition 2. First, in societies where rent
protection is perfect (p = 1), the present value of all future rents is dissipated completely
in the rst period, i.e., when the rent is rst created. A rent seeking loss that is sunk
cannot be recouped in any subsequent deregulation, which is the point that was made
by McCormick et al. (1984). Second, in societies where rent protection is imperfect,
there is, however, a gain from lasting deregulation, as the rent seeking cost is spread over
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time and some of it can, in expectation, be recouped if society instigates appropriate
institutional reforms. The gain is decreasing in rent protection (p). Accordingly, the
incentive to create institutions that allow politicians to commit to lasting deregulation is
stronger in societies where politicians cannot protect incumbentsrents very well. Insofar
as democracy makes it harder for politicians to commit to rent protection, democratic
societies face strong incentives to invest in institutions that allow them to commit to
deregulation. To obtain a sense of how much of the potential rent seeking cost can
be preempted by lasting deregulation, consider a society in which  = 0:9 and p = 0:5
such that rents are protected, on average, for 2 years. In this society, the gain from
deregulation is about 81 percent. In contrast, in a society where p = 0:75 and rents are,
on average, protected for 12 years, 69 percent can be preempted. Even when p = 0:9 and
rents are protected, on average, for 90 years, the saving is still substantial, just under
50 percent. Thus, it is only when rents are extremely well protected (p close to 1) that
lasting deregulation is of no value in preempting social costs of rent seeking; in all other
cases, the prospect of preempting a large fraction of the potential rent seeking cost creates
a substantial interest in deregulation. Of course, in addition to the rent seeking losses
preempted, deregulation of monopolies and removal of trade restrictions also preempt
deadweight loses.
5 Extensions and generalizations
Our analysis is based on a stylized model, but we believe that the main thrust of the
argument can be generalized to more complex and realistic environments. Below we sketch
two such generalizations.
5.1 Non-constant rent protection
We have argued that the degree of rent protection (p) derives from the commitment powers
vested in political institutions. Since institutions tend to persist, it is, to a rst approx-
imation, reasonable to assume that the degree of rent protection is constant over time
and known. However, proposition ?? generalizes to economies where the degree of rent
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protection varies over time. To see this, suppose that pt is drawn each period from a
stationary distribution G (pt) with support on the unit interval and with E (pt) = .9
At the beginning of each period and before any contest takes place, the contenders learn
how well protected rents are going to be during that period (pt). To determine the rent
seeking strategies of the contenders, we calculate the expected present value at time t in
state st = C when the degree of rent protection for the period is pt, denoted Et [V it (C)j pt].
Noting that the environment is stationary from period t+1 onwards, we can write this as
Et

V it (C)
 pt = qit (1   (  pt))
1      yit + Et

V it+1 (C)

; (25)
where Et

V it+1 (C)

is the expected present value in state C at time t+ 1 as perceived at
time t. The value of the rent depends on the realization of pt and the expected benet
from winning the contest is increasing in the current level of rent protection.
The present value of the rent, of course, continues to be 
1  . Maintaining the assump-
tion of full rent dissipation in each contest, the expected value of the resources going into
rent seeking is
Et [Rt (C)] =

1   + Et [Rt+1 (M)] +  (1  )Et [Rt+1 (C)] ; (26)
where Et [Rt (C)] = Et [Rt+1 (C)] and
Et [Rt+1 (M)] = Et [Rt+1 (M)] + (1  ) Et [Rt+1 (C)] : (27)
Combining these equations establishes that Et [Rt (C)] = 1  .
It is natural to interpret the scenario with a constant and known p as one in which
institutions persist for long periods of time, while the scenario in which p is di¤erent
each period can be interpreted as a situation where institutions are very volatile. We
may, therefore, conclude that neither imperfect rent protection (p < 1) nor institutional
volatility (p random) are in themselves sources of under-dissipation of rents.
5.2 Learning about rent protection
Contenders rarely know precisely whether the government who create an enduring rent
has the ability and intension to protect it in the future, but they may learn over time
9For simplicity, we assume that z = 0.
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about these characteristics by observing the behavior of the government. Learning about
rent protection raises many interesting questions, but the spirit of proposition ?? applies
even with learning and asymmetric information.
To see why, consider the following example. Suppose that there are 3 periods, t = 0; 1; 2
and that there is free entry into rent seeking each period. With risk neutrality this leads
to full dissipation of the rent in each contest and for each contender, it follows that the
expected value of participating in a contest is equal to the outside option, normalized to
0.
Furthermore, suppose that there are two types of governments  2 fK;Ng. Govern-
ments of type K are committed to letting the winner of the contest in period 0 keep the
rent for ever. Governments of type N want to orchestra a new contest each period and does
so for sure at time 2. In period 1, however, there is a probability that a government of type
N pretends to be of type K and allows the incumbent to keep the rent. This probability
is denoted  and is a simple way of capturing learning about the type of government.10
Let the prior beliefs that the government is of type K be bp. These beliefs are updated in
period 1 after the state of the world, M (rent sustained) or C (new contest), are observed
using Bayesrule.
We solve this example backwards. In period 2, the incumbent keeps the rent if the
government is of type K, while a contest reassigns the rent if the government is of type N .
At the beginning of period 1, the contenders observe the state of the world s1 2 fM;Cg,
but not the type of government. If s1 = M , the winner from period 0 keeps the rent
and contenders update their beliefs about the type of government. Bayes rules gives the
posterior as
 = Pr[ = Kj s1 =M ] = bpbp+ (1  bp) : (28)
Thus, as of period 1, the expected, discounted payo¤ of the incumbent is  + , while
10Governments of type N might benet directly from orchestrating new rent seeking contests (e.g.
because di¤erent generations of politicians want to capture part of the rent seeking expenditure), but
also benet from being perceived to be able to make commitments (e.g., because it makes it easier get
reappointed). This gives governments of type N an incentive to pretend to be of type K and we can
interpret  as the strategy of type N in an un-modeled signalling game.  = 0 then corresponds to a
separating equilibrium;  = 1 to a pooling equilibrium; and  2 (0; 1) to a semi-seperating equilibrium.
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that of a contender who lost the contest in period 0 is 0+  (1  ) (q2i   y2i). With free
entry in period 2, the expected surplus (q2i   y2i) must be 0. If s1 = C, it is deduced
that the government is of type N and beliefs adjust accordingly. The expected payo¤ is
(q1i   y1i) +  (q2i   y2i), which again, because of free entry, is 0. In period 0, the
expected payo¤ of contender i is
(q0i   y0i) + (bp+ (1  bp) ) q0i( + ) + (1  bp) (1  ) 0; (29)
which after substitution of equation (28) yields
qi0
 
1 +  (bp+ (1  bp) ) + bp2    y0i: (30)
Free entry (full rent dissipation) into each contest implies that the present value of resources
going into rent seeking is
 
1 +  (bp+ (1  bp) ) + bp2  + ((1  bp)(1  )   + 2+  1  bp)2  (31)
which simplies to
 
1 +  + 2

. We note that this is precisely the present value of the
rent, so we get full rent dissipation irrespective of . We can, therefore, conclude that
asymmetric information about the type of government and the associated incentive for the
government to strategically misrepresent its type is not a source of under-dissipation.
6 Specic contest success functions and rent protec-
tion
In the analysis above, we did not specify the contest success function, but assumed that
rent dissipation would be complete in each contest. The neutrality result that the degree
of rent dissipation is independent of p and z reported in proposition 1 would, however,
holds for any contest success function for which the contendersequilibrium investments
are linear functions of the value of the rent ( 
1 p) irrespective of whether dissipation is
complete in each contest or not. Conversely, it follows from the analysis of the design of
contests with short- and long-run contracts in Gürtler (2007) that the result does not hold
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for contest success functions for which the equilibrium investments are non-linear functions
the value of the rent.
To see this, suppose, as in Gürtler (2007), that the contest success function takes the
following form:
qit =
f(yit)Pn
i=1 f(yit)
if
Pn
i=1 f(yit) > 0 (32)
and qit = 1n otherwise. The function f is strictly increasing.
11 Applying this contest
success function, it is easy to verify that the total rent seeking expenditure wasted each
time the state is C is
nh

n  1
n2

1  p

(33)
where h(:) =

f
f 0
 1
(:) is a strictly increasing function. Substituting this into equations
(18) and (21), we nd that the dissipation rate is
nh

n 1
n2

1 p


1 p
: (34)
From this equation, we notice that irrespective of the properties of h, the rent dissipation
rate is always independent of z. On the other hand, it is only independent of p when h is
linear.12 In particular, taking the derivative with respect to p yields
n


h0(:)
n  1
n2

1  p   h(
n  1
n2

1  p)

: (35)
This derivative is negative (positive) if the function h is concave (convex). In other words,
if h is concave (convex), better protection of rents (an increase in p) is associated with
a decrease (an increase) in the rent dissipation rate.13 This analysis shows that rent
protection the extent to which rents endure may in specic circumstances a¤ect the
11To insure a unique interior solution, it is su¢ cient to assume that
f 00
0 NP
j=1
f (:)  (f 0 (:))2 < 0.
12In the special case with n!1 (which implies complete dissipation in each contest), we get that the
rent dissipation rate is 1.
13Gürther (2007) explores the implications of this logic for the optimal choice of contract length and
concludes that contracts should be short (rents should not endure) if the contest success function is convex
and long (and allowed to endure) if it is concave.
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rent dissipation rate. This happens when the the contest success function is such that the
total rent seeking cost is a non-linear function of the value of the rent. In these cases, the
degree of rent protection interacts with pre-existing reasons for under-dissipation of rents
and may reinforce or weaken these reasons. It is also interesting to notice that an increase
in p may reduce the rent dissipation rate, but at the same time increase the total rent
seeking cost. This happens when the function h is concave.
7 Conclusions
Evaluations of social costs of rent seeking only at a point in time are appropriate if rents
do not endure or if rents do endure, but need to be continually re-contested. Rents
are, however, often both enduring and re-contestable. Rents may also disappear in the
future because of changes in government policies. As a consequence, rents are not, in
general, completely dissipated at the time at which they are created. Yet, as we have
shown, the present value of a contested rent remains the correct measure of social loss due
to rent seeking. Since rent seeking activities are often unobserved while the value of rents
can be measured, this is a useful identication principle. We have also shown that the
total rent seeking cost is large in societies where rents are well protected and in which the
government cannot commit to lasting rent-eliminating reforms. Institutional reforms that
allow governments to commit to lasting deregulation or other rent-eliminating reforms can,
with imperfect rent protection, preempt a substantial part of the potential social cost of
rent seeking. The cost of rent seeking that is preempted supplements the social gains from
deregulation through deadweight losses that are saved.
An additional interesting question concerns institutional design. Di¤erent institutional
arrangements empower politicians and governments with di¤erent abilities to protect the
rents of incumbents and to keep rent-creating legislation in place.14 The choice of institu-
tions, of course, depends on the objective function of the designer. Under the assumption
that the government captures a fraction of the resources used in rent seeking, we may note
14See Gradstein (2004) for an interesting analysis of how and why institutions that protect property
rights emerge.
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the "optimal" institutional choice is to commit to full rent protection (p = 1) as this max-
imizes contemporary resource capture. Institutions that limit political competition are
a means of such commitment. Absence of political competition in low-income countries
where corruption is extensive is therefore consistent with high rent extraction and rent
capture at the time at which rents are created.15
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